IntRoductIon
his article proposes a way of viewing expectations and their role on processes of attribution of responsibility. Before I begin, some of the assumptions of the underlying perspective should be mentioned. First, a Strawsonian vision of responsibility is assumed, based on the ideas presented by Peter Strawson in his essay Freedom and Resentment. 1 At the same time, in this work I difer from common interpretations of the essay, centering attention on places usually not considered, in particular, the signiicance of the essay is explored in the legal (not only moral) domain and the importance of expectations (not only reactive attitudes) is discussed in order to understand responsibility.
On the other hand, the hypothesis that every attribution of responsibility process starts with an expectation is embraced, 2 speciically, considering a breached expectation, and that the event that breached the expectation is for what someone is responsible. In this context, one may always ask the one at-tributing responsibility: "What were you expecting to happen?" with the intention that she makes explicit what she is holding someone responsible for.
With these assumptions, this work will show a way of understanding expectations in order to then, study how they are related to responsibility. Finally, this relationship is compared to the model that supposes that every process of attribution of responsibility implies the violation of an obligation from who is responsible.
ExpEctAtIons
Expectations are linked to the idea of expecting in several ways and here we are interested in two of them. First, when one talk about the expectations present in a community, one refers to what is expected from us, as well as what one can expect from others. hey are presented as standards of what should happen. Second, people may adopt these standards and, according to what they say or do, this adoption is attributed to them. his attribution is expressed by saying that persons have expectations and having an expectation means to expect something. he reference to that something places expectations in the group of the propositional attitudes, with desires and beliefs.
herefore, expectations are related to two domains: the generation of standards (i.e. what is expected from the world, others and ourselves) and the adoption of those standards by persons (i.e. to say that someone has or can have an expectation). In this paper I understand expectations as standards which can be adopted (in a normative sense) by the members of a community in order to evaluate events and that allows those members to ask for an explanation of those events.
Over the next pages this approach is explained. In order to do so I take into account three of its characteristics: demands are expressed through expectations; they are reasonable or legitimate demands and; it is rational to ask for an explanation every time an event generates a dissonance with the standard that forms the expectation. hese three characteristics will help us to distinguish expectations from other propositional attitudes like hopes, illusions and Expectations and Attribution of Responsibility (2015) 26 journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu predictions, 3 and to show the importance of expectations in understanding practices of attribution of responsibility.
Expectations, standards and demands
We deal with others expecting from them behaviors that have speciic meanings. i.e. we face each other using standards which help us to identify and evaluate our actions. his is why expectations are usually deined as evaluative standards. 4 When we think of what is expected from us or what we expect from others as evaluative standards, we can understand that certain things are required from us or that there are things that we require from others in diverse degrees of intensity. Accordingly, expectations are demands, demands to others and to the world.
Expectations may be more or less abstract. For example, if Juan expects Antonio's arrival, the request could be understood as a general demand to the world (e.g. Juan demands the world that the cosmos brings Antonio in some way) or as a concrete request to a person to act in a certain way (e.g. Juan demands Antonio to come).
Expectations, as demands, are diferent from predictions yet both have a prospective character. Talking about both we can correctly say that they are formed before the relevant events occur, i.e. the predicted, expected or unexpected event. his makes it possible to compare the standard of the expectation with the event, and to make the dissonance or consonance between them explicit. But in predicting we do not express a demand, if Juan predicts Antonio's arrival, he is not demanding it. 5 Anyway, expectations cannot be reduced to desires. he fulillment of an expectation does not suppose the satisfaction of a need or an interest. Sometimes we expect what we do not desire (e.g. Juan expects Antonio's arrival to a meeting which he does not want to have because they are committed to talk about 3 Propositional attitudes are not separated from each other. On the contrary, they act in sets where one implies the others (See Davidson 2001). Besides, the exact limits between diferent propositional attitudes are far from clear and cases which challenge those limits may always appear. herefore, the distinctions between propositional attitudes presented in this work are not strict and deinitive. Finally, the discussion about whether all propositional attitudes are reducible to beliefs and desires is not treated here. See Smith 1994 : 118-125. 4 See Galtung 1959 Mellema 2004: 4. 5 here are two more ideas to consider. On the one hand, expectations are expressed using subjunctive mood (e.g. "I expect it to rain tomorrow"), while predictions the indicative mood (e.g. "I predict it will rain tomorrow"). On the other hand, we usually we require to make the predictions explicit before the relevant event occurs, but we do not require this in the case of expectations. something he would rather not to talk about). 6 Commonly the standards which are part of interactions have validity independent of an individual's desires.
What is to be expected: Expectations, Legitimacy and Error
As expectations are standards which are part of a community, it is possible that a particular member of the community may adopt them correctly or incorrectly. hus, someone can be mistaken about expecting something (i.e. she expects something, but she cannot expect it). he mistake can be the outcome of diferent things. For example, the lack of information possessed by the person, the wrong perception of the information (e.g. Juan's false belief that it is Tuesday on a Monday, can produce his expectation that Antonio arrives on a Monday because they had agreed to meet on Tuesday; also it can be the case that he expects Antonio to come because he believes Antonio promised to do it, but he really did not) or the result of a misunderstanding about the nature of her relationship with the person from whom she is expecting something (e.g. a boss who expects her employees to act as her friends). Here, the meaning of can is normative, and consists of the entitlement of individuals to make the demand, this is the reason why the demand can be assessed as legitimate or reasonable.
Having this in mind, an expectation can be distinguished by its legitimacy, and its illegitimacy may be due to various reasons. he reasons are context dependent. As Wittgenstein pointed out: "An expectation is embedded in a situation, from which it arises. he expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected." 7 hus, to expect that my body will be attracted to the loor in a spaceship is not reasonable. We can distinguish expectations from hopes and illusions by their legitimacy or reasonability. 8 here is another way in which an individual may be wrong about expectations: having a false idea about her own expectations. Since expectations are propositional attitudes, occasionally they may be opaque to individuals. A person who has an expectation (i.e. an expectation can be appropriately attributed to her) is not always aware of that. 9 In addition, sometimes individuals become 6 his issue is considered by Luigi Ferrajoli in the legal domain: "Las expectativas por otro lado, no tienen necesariamente por argumento prestaciones (omisivas u comisivas) ventajosas para sus titulares: son, en efecto, expectativas también la exposición a sanciones o a anulaciones". aware of what they expect ater the relevant event happens or ater a discussion about how to understand speciic events that have attracted particular attention.
At irst sight, the last airmation in in conlict with the previously expressed one about the prospective character of expectations. But this conlict is apparent, expectations can be expressed in a postdictive (i.e. can be make explicit, after the relevant event occurs) and in a predictive way. 10 To justify the possibility of having an expectation previously to the event is diferent from being aware of it or to expressing it before the relevant events occur.
herefore, there are two ways through which it is stated that a person is wrong regarding expectations. First, it is assumed that the determination of what may be expected in a context is done independently from the concrete beliefs of such individual. Gregory Mellema states that the existence of an expectation does not depend on its possession by the concrete individuals, but what is relevant is the legitimacy to adopt them. In the second case, the determination of the concrete expectations that a person has may be carried out independent of the perception that such a person has regarding her own expectations. 11 In the irst case, attention is centered on expectation as a standard, in the second one, on expectation as a propositional attitude. In both cases determination of what might be expected or of what someone expects is carried out independently of the concrete beliefs of an individual regarding the situation, and assumes the possibility that they might err.
unfulillment of Expectations and the search of Explanations
So far, we have proposed understanding expectations as standards that members of a community may adopt, in the sense that it is legitimate to adopt them under certain circumstances. At the same time, it has been pointed out that expectations present themselves as demands to the world and others. he third characteristic that will be pointed out here involves the relationship bejournal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Sebastián Figueroa Rubio www.revus.eu tween expectations and the events that unfulill them: 12 when having legitimate requirements from the world and others, in the case that they are unfulilled, searching for an explanation of what has happened is rational.
Johan Galtung notes that expectations, as standards, may be compared to various events. his comparison can have three diferent results: a consonance between event and expectation, a dissonance between them, or that the event is not consonant nor dissonant, but neutral. In the last case, the expectation is irrelevant as a standard to assess the event (e.g. the expectation of Juan arriving at certain time appears irrelevant, in principle, to asses that a child stole a candy three years before, in another country). On the other hand, the diference between the other two cases is gradual, that is, depending on the expectation. It can be more or less unfulilled and more or less fulilled, while also cases of complete consonance or dissonance may be found. 13 As legitimate requirements, the search of an explanation is a rational reaction in the case of dissonance between an expectation and what has happened, (i.e. to ask oneself "Why did it happen?") and makes the pertinent inquiries.
It is possible to identify diferences between propositional attitudes through a dispositional-normative model. In this model, to be disposed to (i.e. to be willing to) is characterised by commitments to a certain way of behaving faced with a speciic situation that are attributed to a subject. 14 he relevant situation, usually, is precisely the occurrence of something opposed to the content of the propositional attitude and what establishes the type of propositional attitude is Expectations and Attribution of Responsibility (2015) 26 journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu the response to that. 15 In this order of things, the search of an explanation is characteristic of expectations in the case of dissonance with an event. 16 Applying these ideas to the mentioned example, if Juan is expecting Antonio to arrive at a certain time legitimately (e.g. Antonio promised him), a delay of Antonio allows Juan to ask himself: "Why hasn't Antonio arrived?" If the situation is considered, Juan had a standard of Antonio's behavior (e.g. that he would be present in certain place at certain time); by comparing that standard with a 15 On this see Narváez 2006; Smith 1987; 1994: ch. IV. his model does not deine propositional attitudes as dispositional properties of the individuals, that's why it is identify as dispositionalnormative. herefore, following Robert Brandom, we can think that theories about propositional attitudes ofer accounts of when it is proper to attribute them (see Brandom 2000: 117-118) . So, the quest is for the proper attribution of commitments, not for the properties of individuals. hus, for example, Brandom points out about knowledge that: "In calling what someone has 'knowledge' , one is doing three things: attributing a commitment that is capable of serving both as premise and as conclusion of inferences relating it to other commitments, attributing entitlement to that commitment, and undertaking that same commitment oneself. Doing this is adopting a complex, essentially socially articulated stance or position in the game of giving and asking for reasons", being a central issue in this game "the possibility of extracting information from the remarks of others" (Brandom 2000: 119-120). Moreover, when talking about assertion, he says: "Speciically linguistic practices are those in which some performances are accorded the signiicance of assertions or claimings -the undertaking of inferentially articulated (and so propositionally contentful) commitments.5 Mastering such linguistic practices is a matter of learning how to keep score on the inferentially articulated commitments and entitlements of various interlocutors, oneself included". (Brandom 2000: 164-165) . 16 Having this in mind, we may distinguish expectations from beliefs, at least under the model that understands beliefs by the direction of it metaphor. According to that model, facing a discrepancy between a belief and the events relevant to its satisfaction, the rational reaction is to abandon the belief. he metaphor of the direction of it was adopted by G.E.M Anscombe in her book Intention (Anscombe 1953) in order to distinguish between having an intention and observing it. She explains this through an example: a man goes shopping with a shopping list on his hand, and he is followed by a detective who records what he buys. Ater the shopping, if the list and what he actually buys do not agree, "then the mistake is not in the list, but in the man's performance /…/, whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record" (Anscombe 1953: § 32) . From that, Maribel Narváez indicates that: "Conocemos nuestros propósitos sin observarlos y los manifestamos mediante acciones, que permiten laadscripción de los propósitos en cuestión: de ahí que tenga sentido una concepción disposicional acerca de deseos y creencias. Adscribir a un sujeto la intención de comprar bacon cuando trae bacon a casa en el cesto de la compra no se hace solo a partir de la base de lo que ha traído (podía haberlo comprado por error) sino que además se asume el contrafáctico "Si al llegar a casa el cesto no hubiera contenido bacon habría estado dispuesto a volver al supermercado a comprarlo", dado que atribuir la intención de comprar bacon apoya la verdad de este contrafáctico" (Narváez 2006: 245) . herefore, in the case of beliefs: "creer que p" se deine como aquel estado o actitud que al adscribirse a un sujeto apoya el contrafáctico "si percibiese que no p abandonaría la creencia de que p". (Narváez 2006: 232 n.3). With this model, it is possible to attribute propositional attitudes to others and to explain our own attitudes, and this supposes the possibility of disagreement between both activities in every concrete case. , it may be the case that the mentioned expectation has been unfulilled (e.g. Antonio is not at the established place and time). his leads to the possibility of searching for an explanation (e.g. Juan may relect in this manner: "Why hasn't Antonio arrived? Maybe he had an accident, maybe he didn't want to meet me, etc. "), 17 as well as an evaluation (e.g. Antonio has broken his promise, and that is morally wrong). With regards to the latter, as will be seen, the type of evaluation chosen will depend on the origin of the expectation (in this example, it is judged from the moral expectation of keeping one's promises, assuming that it is morally wrong). 18 his is the entrance to a process of attribution of responsibility that may end in the manifestation of blaming from Juan, in the case of ascribing Antonio the unfulillment of the expectation. his will be further discussed in the following section.
VARIEtIEs of ExpEctAtIons And REsponsIbILIty
A great variety of expectations that people may adopt has been mentioned: to be attracted to the loor, for another person to keep her promise, for another person to act according the law, that people will act expressing good will, etc. hree characteristics that allow treating them all as expectations have also been mentioned: that they suppose a demand; that they are about legitimate requirements; and that, in case of dissonance with an event, an explanation can be sought.
Beyond these common characteristics, in this wide group, it is possible to make some distinctions. A classic distinction, although formulated in diferent ways, diferentiates between cognitive and normative expectations. 19 Before analyzing such a distinction, it must be considered that all the expectations mentioned above are normative, this is precisely manifested in the idea that they are legitimate demands that can be expressed as evaluative standards, and distinguishing them from predictions, illusions, and hopes, their normativ-17 By saying that the unfulillment of an expectation entitles us to search for an explanation, I am not asserting that every search for an explanation is justiied by the unfulillment of an expectation. 18 All this things can be discussed. For example, we can debate whether the break of the promise is immoral, also we can use another kind of expectation to evaluate the event (and the assessment can result in a positive evaluation of the event), etcetera. Besides, the person can be mistaken about his expectation, as we have seen previously. 19 Diferent ways of seeing the distinction between normative expectations and cognitive expectations can be found in Coleman 1992: 279-281; Ferrajoli 1997: 245; Galtung 1959: 215-218; Jakobs 2006: 125-130; Mellema 1998; Paprzycka 1999; Wallace 1994: 20-21. ity has been highlighted. Normativity is a characteristic of them all, not of only a class of them and, viewed this way, there are no non-normative expectations. he label "normative" to classify them may lead to misunderstanding, but it is used in this work due to its widespread use, this is why in the following paragraphs the sense of referring to "normative expectations", as diferent from cognitive expectations, will be explained. 20
normative and cognitive Expectations
Bearing in mind the previous observation, a distinction between expectations will be espoused based on the reactions adopted when facing the unfulillment of an expectation that have become unbearable. hese are diferent reactions from the search of an explanation, a common reaction to all expectations whether or not the unfulillment is unbearable.
he fact that the dissonance becomes unbearable has as a consequence that people commit to an activity directed to achieve consonance. his leads to changes, either in the expectation, or in what explains that the dissonance occurred (ensuring that a similar event doesn't happen again). In this sense, both Johan Galtung and Katarzyna Paprzycka, deine the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations by using the notion of direction of it. 21 More speciically, cognitive expectations have a mind-to-world direction of it while normative expectations a world-to-mind one. his means that if an event unfulills a cognitive expectation, the expectation is usually abandoned or redeined, because it is considered false. 22 On the contrary, when a normative expectation is unfulilled, ways of changing the world are looked for. Galtung points out that in the case of unfulillment of normative expectations formed when facing other people, politics of social control are taken or simply the individual to whom the event that causes the dissonance has been attributed is ignored, all these actions have the goal of avoiding future dissonances.
Günther Jakobs, in his approach to Criminal Law, says that normative expectations are reairmed by punishment, emphasizing the expressive function of the latter. 23 According to this interpretation with punishment, people are not journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law trying to change the world (at least, not always), but to reairm an expectation facing it.
Mellema and Galtung highlight that the whole range of expectation luctuates between both types of reactions and that it is usual that both types of reaction are adequate in diferent measures. Both in our interaction with others, and with the natural surroundings, we are willing to intervene with diferent degrees of intensity in order to avoid unbearable dissonances, and/or in order to modify our expectations of what will happen. his is not a dichotomic distinction, but a gradual one.
Rule Expectations
Another criterion that helps us to understand the diferences between expectations is their origins. he origin of an expectation afects its legitimacy, the type of evaluation at stake and the resistance that expectations present when facing their unfulillment. Expectations may be formed by personal observation of certain regularities, by what our parents tell us, what we see on television, what we learn on the street, what we are taught in school, what the law says, and what scientiic knowledge states as established, among many other things. he origin of an expectation, together with the reasons that support its adoption, allows the identiication of the kind of evaluation carried out when expectations are used as standards (e.g. moral/immoral; legal/illegal, etc.).
Considering this, there is a group of expectations that Gregory Mellema identiies as rule expectations. 24 hese are the ones that are created inside normative systems that are beyond spontaneous interpersonal relations and that are generally created by specialized authorities. Mellema points out that a characteristic of this type of expectations is that the language of obligation appears appropriate to express them. At the same time, in the case of unfulillment, a punishment is considered a suitable reaction. Cases of such expectations are the ones formed by the rules of a club, religious institutions, or legal codes.
If the three characteristics of every expectation are considered, in the case of rule expectations, their legitimacy is usually due to the legitimacy of the authority that dictates them and/or to the possibility to impute their acceptance to the persons whom expectations are applied (i.e. from whom something is expected). his, also, assumes many times requirements are far from what can reasonably be carried out (e.g. to expect that citizens respect a legal norm even if it does not make sense or when following it may lead to immoral results), 25 or ment (for Jakobs is to airm the identity of society) from the existence of punishment as a reaction in a process of attribution of responsibility. 24 Mellema 2004: 4-6. 25 he same event can be assessed using diferent expectations. hus, for example, an action can be considered immoral, but legal, and vice versa. Expectations and Attribution of Responsibility that are contrary to what usually happens (e.g. even though it is common that in a particular neighborhood assaults occur, an individual may expect not to be assaulted). 26 At the same time, depending on the authority who formulates the expectation, it is possible to identify the appropriate kind of evaluation linked to the content of the expectation (e.g. legal and illegal in the case of legal institutions). Finally, in this kind of expectations, the most common explanation of the event that unfulills it is its attribution to a person (i.e. the event is explained by ascribing it to someone), although other explanations may be found. his way in which the three characteristics are manifested is not the only one. A similar analysis can be done of the other expectations that have been mentioned.
Expectations are central to act and interact with others and with the natural and cultural environment in general. hey are one of the most common ways of normalizing reality, allowing us to orientate our conduct. 27 his does not mean that every person is aware of every expectation, but that, one way or another, they can be made explicit.
Expectations, Reactive Attitudes, and Responsibility
In responsibility processes, people look for the person responsible for an event that excites their interest, to make him respond for that. As John Gardner puts it: "hose who are responsible are those who are singled out to bear the adverse normative consequences of wrongful (or otherwise deicient) actions". 28 In this context, expectations, as normative standards, settle the existence of wrongs. his is what we have in mind when we say that the dissonance between an expectation and an event is always present in responsibility processes. herefore, when a person holds another responsible, she does it under the appreciation that an expectation has been breached and that the breach is explained by attributing the event to the person held responsible.
his is in consonance with the idea that the unfulillment of an expectation may be linked to the adoption of a reactive attitude. 29 Reactive attitudes, such as resentment and indignation, are triggered by the occurrence of an event, and are adopted towards others, speciically to whom the event is attributed. 26 Rules expectations (and some normative expectations) may be adopted in spite of our knowledge about how the world is. For example, based on the rules of an institution (or in moral principles) we can expect that Antonio will not lie to us, although, we know he usually lies. 27 See Jakobs 2006: 127; Kelsen 2009 : 74. 28 Gardner 2008 In the quoted article, Gardner comments H.L.A Hart's proposal about the diferent uses of expressions as "responsible" and "responsibility" and in the quoted passage he is speciically talking about liability-responsibility. See Hart 1967. 29 To some authors there is a stronger connection between reactions and the unfulillment of expectations. hey deine normative expectations as those which unfulillment leads to a reactive attitude (Wallace 1994) or to a sanction (Papryzcka 1999). he way in which the distinction is understood in this article does not suppose this strong connection. As Jay Wallace says, in responsibility processes, the triggering event of a reactive attitude is one related to an expectation. 30 In this way, expectations work as standards that help us to identify the relevant events and to identify the kind of evaluative judgments involved as well. 31 Persons are responsible for something that occurs, and this is recognizable by means of expectations.
In consequence, in responsibility practices, a reactive attitude is triggered by an event which unfulilled an expectation. he unfulillment of an expectation, in addition with an explanation of that unfullilment, may result in the attribution of an event to a person and the attitudes which are appropriate to adopt for that unfulillment and/or attribution, generates the entitlement to call them to respond for that event. herefore, we can say that the dissonance between an expectation and an event is always present in responsibility processes. Nonetheless, not every dissonance results in holding someone responsible. Not every relevant event can be ascribed to a person. If the breach of an expectation cannot be attributed to someone, then we do not have someone responsible for it.
In addition, the attribution of responsibility is not always based on the unfulillment of moral expectations, nor on expectations whose unfulillment may only occur by performing an action. On the contrary, a broad range of expectations, can lead to processes of attribution of responsibility. 32 he connection between the unfulillment and the person to whom it is attributed is diverse and can be obtained through causal, intentional, and magical explanations, among 30 Wallace points out that: "Reactive attitudes as a class are distinguished by their connection with expectations, so that any particular state of reactive emotion must be explained by the belief that some expectation has been breached. It is the explanatory role of such beliefs about the violation of an expectation that is the deining characteristic of the states of reactive emotion as a class, and that provides them with their distinctive propositional objects; beliefs of this sort will therefore always be present when one is in one of the reactive states" Wallace 1994: 33. he point is also expressed by Joel Feinberg (1970a) in what he calls responsibe attitudes. 31 About this, from his second person's perspective, Stephen Darwall says that: "Reactive attitudes thus concern themselves not with a person's overall agency, but speciically with his conduct with respect to claims or demands that other persons have standing to make of him. " Darwall 2006: 80. 32 See Williams 1995: 40. To consider that only moral expectations are relevant to responsibility lead us to what John Goldberg, in tort law, calls the moralistic fallacy. In his words: "he error in the supposition is its insistence on an unjustiiably rigid or narrow conception of what can count as a wrong. he ideas of committing a wrong, and being held responsive for a wrong, can vary with context without collapsing into vacuity. It is a fallacy -call it the moralistic fallacy -to suppose that the essence of wrongdoing is a strong form of culpability or blameworthiness. To fall prey to this fallacy is to treat all wrongdoing as a species of sin; as a transgression that leaves a stain on the wrongdoer's soul and warrants strong condemnation. " Goldberg 2015. his point is important in order to see the possible consequences of a strawsonian account in the legal domain. As we can see in note 2, Strawson is thinking in one moral expectation (the expectation that other expresses goodwill towards us).
others. As has been pointed out, expectations have diverse origins and ind support in diferent kinds of reasons. In fact, the same event can be related to diferent kinds of expectations, and be evaluated in diferent manners. 33 herefore, it is recommendable to assume a broad notion on expectations that considers everything that is legitimate to expect and whose unfulillment encourages the search of an explanation. Also, in principle, this broad range can be related to practices of attribution of responsibility. In Joel Feinberg's words: "he point is this: we do not ordinarily raise the question of responsibility for something unless that something has somehow excited our interest". 34 conduct rules. hey are understood as "the rules under which something is judged as right or wrong, good or bad, they have a directive (prescriptive) or evaluative (axiological) character". 36 his rules are addressed to citizens (i.e. people from whom certain conducts are expected) and they have the structure of a categorical standard. hey are usually manifested as criminal ofences.
Following what has been mentioned in the previous pages, conduct rules can be understood as rules expectations. 37 In fact, expectations fulill the functions that Hruschka attributes to conduct rules. According to this author, conduct rules have, irst, a coniguration function, being its mission to inluence on and to shape people lives. 38 his is done by indicating them what they must or must not do or what is allowed to be done and/or to stop doing (i.e. what is expected from them and what can they expect from others). he other is a measurement scale function, directed to the judge (in a broad sense) who evaluates the events ex post facto, using the measure given by the norms. 39 To Hruschka, both are two sides of the same coin.
Considering what has been said in the above paragraphs, to some extent the distinction between conduct rules and expectations is merely terminological. But there are reasons that can make us inclined to talk about expectations rather than conduct rules in the context of attribution of responsibility practices. One of those reasons concerns the scope of the approach defended in this work. My concern is with standards that are present not only in criminal law, but in other areas of law and morals as well. he domain of expectations is broader than that of conduct rules, at least in the way in which they are understood by the quoted authors. 40 To this, Mellema adds that the domain of moral expectations is even broader than the one of moral obligations, and that the unfulillment of any of these expectations, in certain contexts, can derive in a process of attribution of responsibility. A couple of examples to illustrate this idea can be useful. 41 At a long queue waiting for a table at a restaurant, one can legitimately have the expectation that people who have inished their meal and are aware of others, will stand up and give their place to others within a reasonable amount of time, so it 36 is expected from someone that has committed to write a letter of recommendation to say only positive things about the person he is recommending. Although having these expectations, legitimate in both cases, it cannot be said that the people sitting at a table, or the person writing the recommendation are morally obliged to do what is expected from them. Mellema points out that this type of expectations, which are not comparable to moral duties, can be recognized because, when facing them, the correct reaction (in terms of sanction) is usually less intense. hus, for example, instead of being expressed through blaming, it is expressed through disappointment. But a less intense reaction, does not mean that the one to whom the unfulillment of the expectation is ascribed is not being held responsible.
he point is that what is required in terms of expectations is broader than what can be recognized as someone's moral (or legal) obligations. So, not every expectation that generates responsibility is an obligation. 42 By talking of expectations, we hold a weaker normativity than the one held when speaking of conduct rules and obligations. One can be responsible of things to which one does not have a duty, or at least, it is better to make room for this possibility. 43 he diference is, without a doubt, gradual, and if the reader wants to understand conduct rules and moral obligations in a weak sense, the diference between both and expectations becomes imperceptible.
Finally, another way of arguing can be considered, having in mind the difference that Kelsen establishes between having an obligation and being responsible. According to Kelsen, obligations determine the existence of delicts, and only the person who has an obligation can commit a delict. Although the sanction is connected to the delict by imputation, the responsible person and the person with the obligation do not have to coincide. In fact, it is precisely this distinction what allows to explain cases of vicarious responsibility, where the one held responsible is a diferent person than the one that commits the delict. 44 his way, Kelsen states that:
here is an obligation to act in a determinate way when the oppose conduct is the condition of a sanction /…/ on the contrary an individual is responsible for a determinate conduct (his own conduct or another person's conduct) when, in case of the opposite conduct, it is directed a sanction towards she. So, responsibility may be related with someone else's conduct, while obligations have always as object the conduct of the obligated person. 45 42 Another reason to talk about expectations rather than rules is that we say naturally that a person has an expectation (talking about who is holding another responsible), but we do not say that a person has a rule. 43 his makes room to the possibility of translating conduct rules and obligations into expectations. Ferrajoli (1997: 240-247) apparently agrees with this idea. 44 Kelsen 1967 : 114-119. 45 Kelsen 2009 journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law Not having in mind the distinction between obligation and responsibility can explain the need of some authors for there always to be an action in order to have responsibility. On the contrary, on many occasions, people are held responsible on the basis of their relationship with objects and others, or only considering causal relations that link them to the event in question, independent of their actions.
hen it is plausible to assert that appealing to the unfulillment of an expectation as a starting point of judgment of attribution of responsibility has a wider explanatory power than appealing to the unfulillment of an obligation or conduct rule. One can be responsible even when not having unfulilled any duty with one's own actions, as it is in cases of strict responsibility. In these cases, relevant expectations do not refer to actions of individuals, but to certain facts that are considered harmful o dangerous, e.g. the level of environmental pollution.
Understanding expectations as standards that can be adopted by members of a community in order to evaluate some events and that entitles such members to search for an explanation of those events, allows us to understand their link with responsibility, precisely because people are held responsible due to the occurrence of a wrong, which does not have to be directly linked with the breach of an obligation. Also, the search for an explanation allows us to open the door to the ascription of the event that unfulills the expectation to a person, whether that person who has or has not the one that commits an illicit conduct. 46 To that person, the reactive attitudes will be directed from whom is holding them responsible.
In a process of attribution of responsibility, before discussing excuses and justiications, one can question if the person attributing responsibility is justiied in having a certain expectation or if he only had an illusion; also, considering the context, one can question the type of evaluation that is being carried out from the said expectation (e.g. legal/illegal; moral/immoral); whether the adopted expectation is appropriate (e.g. many times expectations with origins in legal norms do not entitle us to hold someone responsible because of its unfulillment in extra-legal contexts). Also, one can discuss about the event: what are its relevant characteristics (e.g. how is it described) or whether or not it occurred under the relevant description in terms of the expectation. In addition, whether the event has really a suicient relation (i.e. dissonance) with the expectation can be questioned, and if such a relation does exist, how should it be 46 An event may be ascribed to a person (i.e. it is charged to her record. See Feinberg 1970b) without the consequence of ascribing responsibility to that person for that event. We can (and should) distinguish between the ascription of events and the ascription of responsibility. his does not suppose the denial that every time we ascribe responsibility we are ascribing an event. he event is for what someone is responsible, more speciically, the event which breaches an expectation. he point is that the ascription of an event to someone is not enough to say that she is held responsible.
